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AN INTRODUCTION TO RICO
Joseph C. Sweeney*
In October of this year, I will have been an admiralty lawyer and
proctor in admiralty for thirty years, and I have witnessed the con-
servative attitude of the maritime bar on many issues. For instance,
most of you are familiar with the Lloyd's hull policy with respect to
ships; the same form of hull policy has been used consistently from
the seventeenth century to well into the twentieth century. It can
hardly be said that the developments of the last 300 years have not
precipitated a need to change the wording of the hull policy. The
conservative attitude of the maritime bar is similarly evident in char-
ter parties, where many clauses are deliberately ambiguous. Admi-
ralty lawyers prefer to leave them ambiguous rather than change
them to more closely address the problems that the clauses were
designed to handle.
The Limitation of Liability Statute of the United States serves as a
excellent illustration of the maritime bar's inertia.' The Act was
drafted in 1851, and poorly drafted at that. Almost 140 years has
passed and no one has seen fit to make the Act any more comprehen-
sible. The Act was amended in 18862 and we are still trying to ascer-
tain what the amendments were all about. Besides the addition of the
Sirovich Amendments of 19351 and 1936,4 the only other change
occurred two years ago when Congress increased the amount of the
fund for personal injury and death cases from $60 per ton to $420 per
ton.5 Except for these amendments, the original statute remains sub-
stantially intact.
Despite the conservative attitude of our profession, it now occurs to
the maritime bar that perhaps a piece of legislation passed in 1970
may speak to the maritime fraud problem. The legislation is, of
course, "RICO" - the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
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I. Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 183-189 (1982).
2. Act of June 19, 1886, ch. 421, § 4, 24 Stat. 80 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 188 (1982)).
3. Act of Aug. 29, 1935, ch. 804, § 3, 49 Stat: 960 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1982)).
4. Act of June 5, 1936, ch. 521, § 3, 49 Stat. 1479 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1982)).
5. Act of Oct. 19, 1984, § 213(a), 98 Stat. 2306 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1982)).
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tions Act.6 Maritime fraud has always had a connection with the
docks, yet it is not limited to blue collar crime. The maritime indus-
try has always had lightly capitalized companies that might defraud
the unwary, whether in good times or bad times. The current dis-
tressed state of the maritime industry has aggravated matters, how-
ever, and RICO may prove to be an amenable solution.
One problem that has plagued the maritime industry for years is
maritime fraud in the physical movement of maritime bills of lading.
A modem solution to this problem is to keep the bill of lading at a
single location and let all transactions proceed by telex. The with-
drawal of Chase Manhattan Bank from the SeaDocs system in Janu-
ary 1987, however, indicates that this solution will not be a viable
option. Consequently, we are still faced with the possibility of consid-
erable fraud in maritime bills of lading.
Until the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,7 many practitioners viewed RICO's
broad application as an aberration. My colleague, Mr. Douglas
Abrams, has published an important article on Sedima in which he
notes that the Supreme Court has construed the RICO statute as not
limiting the classes of litigants that can bring a RICO suit.' While the
broad language Congress used in RICO caused some doubt as to the
statute's constitutionality, Sedima suggests that those doubts can be
set to rest.
On January 15, 1969, Senate Bill 30, also known as the Organized
Crime Control Act, was introduced to the Ninety-first Congress. The
statute was approved by the Senate and the House9 and signed into
law by President Nixon on October 15, 1970. Title IX of that Act
contains the RICO provisions. The civil RICO provisions of interest
to the maritime bar were the work of Senator Roman L. Hruska of
Nebraska. 10
It is interesting to note that Congress's consideration of the Organ-
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
7. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
8. Abrams, The Place of Procedural Control in Determining Who May Sue or Be Sued:
Lessons in Statutory Interpretation from Civil RICO and Sedima, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1477
(1985).
9. Congressmen William F. Ryan, Abner J. Mikva, and John Conyers, Jr., dissented to the
House Committee Report, describing Title IX as legislation "run [ ] amuck. It employs
penalties and investigative procedures which are both abusive and pregnant with the potential
for abuse." 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (91 Stat.) 4081.
10. For a discussion of RICO's origins, see Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in
Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 249-80 (1982).
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ized Crime Control Act coincided with a period of extreme violence
in this country and the world. The national euphoria of the previous
summer incited by the lunar landing had evaporated in the face of
opposition to the government policy in Vietnam. That opposition, at
times, was ugly. On May 4, 1970, four students were killed at Kent
State University by the Ohio National Guard. This event disrupted
campuses throughout the summer, and continued with an orgy of
recrimination and protest in response to the activities of the govern-
ment in Cambodia and Vietnam. That summer of violence was
closely followed by international terrorism when four aircraft were
hijacked in Europe that September by the "Black September Move-
ment" of Palestinians. Violence was no doubt on the mind of the
Judiciary Committee as it considered the Organized Crime Control
Act during that fateful summer of 1970.
A few words about the substantive provisions of the statute are in
order. It is important to note that the context in which RICO has
been enacted is decidedly criminal, an area where plaintiffs' lawyers
seldom trespass. Furthermore, it is hornbook law that any judicial
construction of criminal statutes should be rigorous.
RICO is one part of the complex bill entitled the "Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970." 11 Title IX of that statute contains both crimi-
nal and civil RICO provisions. As described in the House Report, the
threefold purpose of RICO is:
(1) making unlawful the receipt or use of income from
"racketeering activity" or its proceeds by a principal in com-
mission of the activity to acquire an interest in or establish
an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce; (2) prohibit-
ing the acquisition of any enterprise engaged in interstate
commerce through a "pattern" of "racketeering activity,"
and (3) proscribing the operation of any enterprise engaged
in interstate commerce through a "pattern" of "racketeering
activity."' 2
The legislative history behind civil RICO indicates that it was
meant as a civil remedy for the criminal violations already provided
for in section 1962. Civil RICO is intended to assist in the reform of
corrupted organizations. It does this by permitting the courts to
require performance bonds by those who deal with corrupted organi-
11. Pub. L. No. 9-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended in various sections of 18 U.S.C.
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
12. 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (91 Stat.) 4010.
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zations, permitting treble damages for any person injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of a criminal violation of RICO, and
allowing the collateral estoppel doctrine to be applied in favor of the
government in civil proceedings after a successful criminal
prosecution.
The legislation had something for everybody. For some, RICO
provides a tool well suited for union bashing; it did seem that corrupt
unions were the target of the bill. For others, it put the federal gov-
ernment into the business of prosecuting organized crime, something
which J. Edgar Hoover had been resisting for many years. This was
the context in which civil RICO was enacted. It is surrounded by,
and identified with, the criminal law. Undoubtedly, this racketeering
stigma will influence the frequency and character of RICO suits
brought by the maritime bar.
